We present a bimodal logic suitable for formalizing reasoning about points and sets, and also states of the world and views about them. The most natural interpretation of the logic is in subset spaces, and we obtain complete axiomatizations for the sentences which hold in these interpretations. In addition, we axiomatize the validities of the smaller class of topological spaces in a system we c a l l topologic. W e also prove decidability for these two systems.
Introduction
What are elds of mathematics, such as probability theory, p o i n t-set topology, and combinatorics, about? When asked this, a mathematician is likely to answer that the eld is about various mathematical concepts, or about the consequences of some axioms or other. Although this answer would be adequate for many purposes, it misses a deeper answer that areas of mathematics can be seen as repositories for our intuitions about several aspects of ordinary life. For example, combinatorics can be seen as just the mathematical home for intuitions about activities like counting and arranging. General topology can be seen as the home for intuitions about closeness.
The point of this paper is to suggest that simple aspects of topological reasoning are also connected with special-purpose logics of knowledge. Our goal is to exhibit a formal system which can express simple reasoning about points and sets of the kind that one nds in the very early parts of general topology. The formal system is a modal logic of the kind found in much recent w ork on the logic of knowledge. However, our project di ers from other work both in the technical details of the logic and in the overall motivation.
There are three sources of motivation for our project. First, we are interested in the project of accounting for mathematical practice in weak logical systems whose primitives are appropriately chosen. Our logical system is intended to be a rst step in the direction of accounting for topological reasoning. As it stands, it is far too weak. But we feel that our completeness and decidability results suggest that this system, or something like it, may b e on the right t r a c k.
To make this point in more detail, we believe that although mathematical reasoning may be represented in a relatively strong system like rst-order logic, this representation is not always appropriate because rst-order logic gives one the ability t o m a k e complicated assertions that were not seen to be relevant at the outset that is, because it is universally applicable, its particular application in any setting may be unreasonably expressive. (When we m o ve to higher-order logic, the situation is even worse.) A less expressive system is likely to have a l o wer complexity. T h i s w ould correspond to our intuition that certain kinds of reasoning in point-set topology are in some sense easy. Our goal is precisely to account for the easy parts of topological reasoning.
Second, our study is a contribution to the ongoing development of logics of knowledge because it has an alternative i n terpretation in terms of the notion of e ort. T raditionally ( HM] , Pa] , PR] , CM]), knowledge is de ned in terms of the notion of view. An individual has a view of the world or state, and what that individual knows is whatever is true in all states which are compatible with its view. Thus, for instance, in distributed computing, the role of view is played by what a processor sees, i.e. its local history. Other notions that arise, like common knowledge, can then be de ned in a natural way. Similarly, in Mathematical Economics, the notion of view is formalized through some partition. If the actual state is s, then the individual knows only that it is in the equivalence class of s, and this class can then be identi ed with its view.
However, a notion of e ort enters in topology. T h us if we are at some point p and make a measurement, we will then discover that we are in some neighborhood u of p, but not know exactly where. If we m a k e m y measurement ner, then u will shrink, say, to a smaller neighborhood v. A similar consideration arises also in computation. If we are willing to compute for 10 steps, then we m a y discover that f( 0 ) = 1 a n d t h a t f(1) = 2. However, the computation of f(2) takes more than 10 steps and so we m a y not know whether we are computing the successor function or not. If, however, we are willing to invest 20 steps, then perhaps we will nd that f(2) = 7 and so f is not the successor function after all. Note, however, that we never can discover that f is the successor function.
Such a situation may also arise in ordinary life. Thus if a policeman is measuring the speed of passing cars, his knowledge is con ned to the cars that are in his view, i.e. in this case, those cars that he can see. However, his knowledge of the speeds of the cars that he can see will depend on the accuracy of his measuring instrument. He can increase his knowledge without changing his view, by just using a more accurate measuring instrument. Nonetheless, his knowledge will generally be such that he can always improve it. This fact forces us to represent the situation using two modalities, one for knowledge, which i s t h e usual K, and the other which depends on the e ort, and this second modality will denoted by our familiar symbol 2.
The point of these analogies is that often one wants to study a situation where the state of the world is only approximately known, and where partial knowledge of the state of the world is represented in some notion of view, and where discussion of both views and the world is rei ed in some logical setting. The kinds of logics we study are intended to be vehicles for the study of a very wide range of these kinds of situations. We believe that the intuitions captured in our logic could be used, for example, in getting a formal account o f the well-known analogies between recursion theory and descriptive set theory.
A nal motivation for our work is the development of logical tools for visual reasoning, and with educational software that goes with this. Shin Sh] gave a formal account o f t h e use of Venn Diagrams as a tool in elementary reasoning. In a sense, her work is part of an ongoing rehabilitation of diagrammatic reasoning vis a vis purely symbolic manipulation. We believe that elementary topology should be amenable to a similar treatment, since in fact diagrams are as essential in point-set topology as they are in set theory. It is likely that the kind of logical tools we are developing will be useful in an analysis of how diagrammatic reasoning is useful in learning elementary topology.
Comparison with other work There are several places where our work is connected to other logical studies. The project of relating topology to modal logic was begun by McKinsey McK]. Our language and semantics are more expressive t h a n S4 and McKinsey's topological interpretation of it, and in fact we obtain an embedding of the theorems of S4 i n to those of topologic.
Vickers' book Vi] on the logical and conceptual foundations of topology is a step closer to the kind of notions that we make explicit. In a sense, one could say that our logics allow one to study the aspects of the Stone duality where s h r i n k i n g a n o p en corresponds to gaining information.
Finally, Georgatos G1, G2] has obtained the completeness theorem for topologic independently. Also the nite model property for topologic was rst shown in G1]. Georgatos has gone on G3] to study the logic on tree spaces, an interesting interpretation which w e have not considered.
Contents of this paper. The logic and its semantics are put forth in Section 1. That section also discusses the main classes of interpretations which w e study, and also our axioms concerning them. Finally, w e h a ve an extended discussion of two examples in Section 1.3 these examples are used at several points in the paper to provide counterexamples to various assertions.
The main completeness theorem for the subset space logic of Section 2.2 is a direct construction using the properties of maximal consistent sets. A ltration argument for decidability is presented in 2.3. None of the details from these sections is needed for the remainder of the paper, since the arguments for the completeness and decidability results for topologic are quite di erent.
We study a logic of intersection spaces in Section 2.4. This logic is intermediate between the basic logic of subset spaces and the system of topologic. Unfortunately, w e do not have completeness for this system, but we d o h a ve some sound axioms which w e know not to be complete. We might remark in passing that in some of the possible applications of our work and its eventual extensions, the axiom of intersection will not be so natural. We h a ve i n mind settings like quantum mechanics, where the collection of observations would certainly not be closed under intersection.
Finally, w e t a k e up topologic in Section 3. We p r o ve completeness and decidability, a n d we also discuss the relation of topologic to McKinsey's work. All of the results on topologic may be read after Section 2.1.
A Language and Its Semantics
De nition A subset frame is a pair X = hX Oi where X is a set of points and O is a set of non-empty subsets of X called opens. (In contexts farther removed from topology, i t might be more suggestive to call these results or evidence.) It will be convenient to assume that X2 O . X is an intersection frame if whenever u v 2 O and u \ v 6 = , then also v \v 2 O . A lattice f r ame is closed under nite unions, and a complete lattice f r ame is closed under the in nitary intersection and union operations.
We n o w set up a formal language which is expressive enough for simple arguments concerning subset spaces. Later we shall expand this language.
De nitions Let A be an arbitrary set of atomic sentences. L is the smallest set containing each A 2 A , and closed under the following formation rules: if 2 L , then so are ^ and : i f 2 L , t h e n K 2 L and 2 2 L .
A subset space is a triple X = hX O i, where hX Oi is a subset frame, and : A ! PX. I f hX Oi is an intersection frame, then X is called an intersection space, and similarly for lattice spaces, etc. (Often we simply speak of models.) For p 2 X and p 2 u 2 O , w e de ne the satisfaction relation j = X on (X O ) L by recursion on . p u j = X A i p 2 (A) p u j = X ^ i p u j = X and p u j = X p u j = X : i p u 6 j = X p u j = X K i q uj = X for all q 2 u p u j = X 2 i p v j = X for all v 2 O such t h a t p 2 v u
In other words, we are considering a Kripke structure whose worlds are the pairs (p u) a n d with two accessibility relations corresponding to shrinking an open (2) while maintaining a reference point, or to moving a reference point inside the given open (K).
We adopt standard abbreviations: _ means :(: : ), L means :K: , and 3 means :2: . S o p u j = X L if there exists some q 2 u such that q uj = X , a n d p u j = X 3 if there exists v 2 O such that v u and p v j = X .
As usual, we write p u j = if X is clear from context. We write p u j = T i for all 2 T, p u j = . I f T L , w e write T j = if for all models X, a l l p 2 X, and all u 2 O , if p u j = X T, t h e n a l s o p u j = X . Finally, w e also write, T j = Int and T j = top for the natural restriction of this notion to the class of models which a r e i n tersection and topological spaces.
Certain kinds of sentences will have special interest for us. Given a model X, a n d a sentence , is persistent in X if for all p u v, p u j = X implies p v j = X . ( W e stress that we only use the notation p v j = when p belongs to v.) Further, is bi-persistent in X if for all p u v, w e h a ve p u j = X i p v j = X . ( W e stress that we only use the notation p v j = when p belongs to v.) It is (bi)-persistent if it is (bi-)persistent i n a l l X.
A sentence is reliable in a model X if K ! 2K is valid in M and reliably known if it is valid in every X. A sentence of the form K2 is itself always reliably known.
Reliably known sentences represent reliable knowledge and have a rather intuitionistic avor. However, our logic is classical, since we are trying to represent certain knowledge theoretic ideas in a classical setting, rather than use an intuitionistic setting where such ideas would be presupposed. If the topology is discrete, then the only reliable sentences will be persistent. By contrast, with the trivial topology, o n l y tautologies will tend to be reliable. Thus, for example, assuming that all boolean combinations of i(A) a n d i(B) are non-empty, then the only sentences involving A and B which are reliable will be tautologies. Note that when v is a subset of u, t h e n e v ery reliably known sentence satis ed by p u is also satis ed by p v con rming our intuition that re ning from u to v increases knowledge.
If X is indeed a topology, then a set i(A) w i l l b e o p e n i e v ery point i n i(A) has an open neighborhood contained entirely in i(A) i a t e v ery p in i(A), the sentence 3KAholds. to see that with the obvious de nitions, r.e. subsets of the natural numbers will satisfy the same knowledge theoretic sentence that opens do in a topological setting, and this, we believe, is the source of the similarity. The set i(A) i s dense i the sentence LA is valid and it is nowhere dense if 3L:A is valid.
The Axioms
The main technical goal of this paper is to axiomatize the validities for several classes of models. We consider the classes of all subset spaces, intersection spaces, lattice spaces, and complete lattice spaces. Here are the basic axioms of our logic:
All substitution instances of tautologies of classical propositional logic
and we use the following rules of inference
We call the axioms K2 ! 2K , t h e Cross Axioms. The Cross Axioms are perhaps the characteristic axiom of the system, and them are often used the dual form 3L ! L3 .
The remaining axioms amount to the assertions that K is S5-like, and 2 is S4-like.
The axioms and rules of inference are sound for subset spaces. The argument is a routine induction on proofs, and perhaps the only interesting part concerns the Cross Axiom. Let us x a subset space X and assume that p u j = K2 w e claim that p u j = 2K . T o see this, let v be an arbitrary subset of u containing p. W e need to see that p v j = K , so let q 2 v. Then q 2 u also, so q u j = 2 . Therefore q v j = . S i n c e q was arbitrary in u, w e have p v j = K .
The soundness of the logical system is now a straightforward induction on proofs. We show in Section 2 that this axiomatization is complete. Following standard methods of modal logic, our proof uses facts concerning the collection of (maximal consistent) theories in the logic. However, a problem that we face is that there does not seem to be any c o n venient way to de ne a set-space structure on the m-theories in order to get completeness in a very direct way.
We next consider what happens when O is required to be closed under intersections the space is then an intersection space. Here is the simplest new axiom scheme:
Weak Directedness Axioms 32 ! 23 .
This scheme is obviously sound for intersection spaces, since if x u j = 2 and v is any other neighborhood of x, t h e n u \ v u and so x u \ v j = .
As it happens, the Weak Directedness Axioms do not lead to a complete axiomatization of the valid sentences on intersection spaces. We discuss the incompleteness further in Section 1.3, and in Section 2.4 we present some other, more complicated axioms. It is still open to get a complete axiom system for intersection spaces.
Finally, for lattice spaces, we h a ve the following scheme:
Union Axioms 3 ^L3 ! 3 3 ^L3 ^K3L( _ )]. To c heck soundness on spaces closed under unions, suppose that U, V X with x 2 U and y 2 V , and suppose that x U j = and y V j = . Then there is a neighborhood W = U V of x which c o n tains one open set, U, where is satis ed and another, V , where is satis ed. Since each point o f U V is either in U or V , e v ery point i n W has a neighborhood in which e i t h e r L or L is satis ed. Note that here we require that both U and W contain x.
The system whose axioms are the subset space axioms together with the Weak Directedness Axioms and Union Axiom will be called topologic. The idea is that topologic should be strong enough to support elementary topological reasoning. We s h o w in Section 3.3 that the topologic axioms give a complete axiomatization of the validities on topologies and indeed on all lattice spaces. The completeness result goes by considering a canonical model, and it also shows the relation between our work and the older studies of McKinsey and Tarski on modal logic and topology. Indeed, the canonical model turns out to be a complete lattice, and thus our axioms are complete for the classes of topological spaces and complete lattice spaces as well. Topologic has the nite model property (3.5) and is therefore decidable. The valid sentences on subset spaces and intersection spaces do not have t h i s p r o p e r t y. H o wever, in Section 2.3 we adapt ltration to show that the subset space validities are decidable.
Examples
In this section, we p r e s e n t three examples. The rst should help the reader to become familiar with the semantics and with the various axioms we study. These other two examples are somewhat pathological, and hence they also help to motiva t e s o m e o f t h e t e c hnicalities of our later constructions.
Example A. Consider the case when X is the set R of real numbers, and O is the standard topology on R. Suppose that there are two atomic predicates P and I, and that (P) = 0 2], and I] = fx 2 R : x is irrationalg. T h e n ( 1 (0 3)) j = P, Also, since 2:5 2 (0 3), (1 (0 3)) j = L:P. Moreover, (1 (0 3)) j = 3KP, since we can shrink (0 3) around 1 to (:5 1:1), say, a n d h a ve the new neighborhood entirely inside the interpretation of P. T h i s shrinking is possible at all points inside (P ), and so (0 R ) j = K(P ! 3KP). The points and opens of this space are shown in Figure 2 , but we h a ve not indicated the singleton sets w 0 n . ( W e w ant these sets in order to get a space closed under intersections.)
The language has three predicates A, B, a n d C w e i n terpret them by i(A) = fa i : i 2 Ng, i(B) = fb i : i 2 Ng, a n d i(C) = fcg. 
We claim that no sentence of the form (1) Consider next the following scheme:
The Weak Union Axioms also hold in this example. Since there are a number of cases, we only present a few of them. Suppose that p u 1 j = and q u 2 j = . T h e n f o r a n y x 2 X we h a ve x X j = L3 , where L3 ^L3 ^K3L( _ ) : The most interesting case is where, e.g., p u 1 j = and z 2 v 2 j = . Here, z 1 v 1 satis es as well, since v 1 and v 2 are isomorphic. Thus for any y 2 u 1 we h a ve y u 1 j = .
However, there are Union Axioms which fail here for example z 2 X j = 3K(:Q)^L3(LP^K:Q) but z 2 X 6 j = 3 LP^K:Q] Note that, pre xed by a n L, this sentence would be satis ed. This was the key idea for showing that the Weak Union Axiomd are satis ed.
To summarize: this space satis es the Weak Union Axioms but not the Union Axioms. Hence the former scheme is properly stronger. There is a second reason for introducing this example, having to do with the m-theories realizable in various spaces.
This example will also show w h y the subset space logic and Weak Directedness Axioms are incomplete for the class of intersection spaces. First, de ne P not Q and Q not P as LP: LQ and LQ: LP respectively then a u 1 j = P not Q a u 2 j = Q not P:
Figure 2: Example C Therefore a X j = 3(P not Q)^3(Q not P) (3) and since z 1 and z 2 are the only Z-points,
In other words, it is not possible to take a single Z-point z from X and then be able to both shrink X to one open containing a P-point b u t n o Q-points and to take the same z and shrink X to another open containing a Q-point but no P-points. Let be the conjunction of the sentences in (3) and (4). We claim that cannot be realized in a space closed under intersection in fact, the proof shows that it cannot be realized in a space which i s d o wnwarddirected under inclusion. For suppose that X 0 were such a space, and a 0 X 0 j = . Let u 0 1 be such that a 0 u 0 1 j = P not Q, and let u 0 2 be such that a 0 u 0 2 j = Q not P. B y h ypothesis, we h a ve some w 0 u 0 1 \u 0 2 which belongs to O 0 . S i n c e a 0 X 0 j = , and since K2LZ is a conjunct of , let z 0 2 w 0 satisfy Z. N o w w 0 u 0 1 , s o z 0 X 0 j = 3(P not Q). Similarly, z 0 X 0 j = 3(Q not P).
But now w e contradict (4), since z 0 X 0 j = Z^3(P not Q)^3(Q not P):
From this observation we can see that the subset space axioms together with the Weak Directedness Axioms are not complete for intersection spaces. That is, we h a ve s h o wn that j = int : . H o wever, together with all these axioms comprise a consistent set. Since the axioms cannot prove : , they are not complete.
Concerning unions, note that a X j = 3((P not Q)^3K:P)^3((Q not P)^3K:Q) (5) The witnesses are u 1 and u 2 . Also a X j = K(Z ! : (3(P not Q)^3(Q not P))) (6) Let be the conjunction of the sentences in (5) and (6). We claim that has no models which are closed under unions. For suppose X 0 were such a model. Let u 0 1 and v 0 1 be witnesses in X 0
to (5) 2 The Logic of Subset Spaces
In this section, we p r o ve a completeness theorem for the relation j = o n t h e c l a s s o f s u b s e t spaces. We use the subset space axioms alone.
Properties of Theories
The proof of the Completeness Theorem uses maximal consistent subsets of L, w h i c h w e call m-theories.
Fix a language L, and let T H be the set of m-theories in L. In the sequel, we use U, V , etc., to denote m-theories. In order to prove t h a t w e h a ve given a complete proof system, we need only show that for every m-theory T, there is a subset space model X = hX O i, a point x 2 X, and a subset u 2 O such that p u j = X T.
De nitions We de ne the relation ;! L and ;! 3 on m-theories by: U;! L V i whenever 2 V , L 2 U U;! 3 V i whenever 2 V , 3 2 U. (1) ;! L is an equivalence r elation.
(2) ;! 3 is re exive and transitive. (3) If L 2 T, then there is some U so that 2 U and T;! L U. (4) If 3 2 T, then there is some U so that 2 U and T;! 3 U.
Proof For example, we prove (1). Let U be an m-theory. I f 2 U, t h e n a s ! L , w e also have L 2 U. This proves that ;! L is relexive. Using the fact that LL ! L , w e see that ;! L is transitive. Finally, suppose that U;! L V . T o s h o w that V ;! L U, l e t 2 U, I f L = 2 V , then by maximality w e m ust have K: 2 V . LK: 2 U. By S5-ness, LK: ! : . S o : 2 U. But this means that U is inconsistent, and this is a contradiction. Hence ;! 3 is symmetric. In this way, w e v erify all of the properties of an equivalence relation.
The proof of (2) is similar, using the S4-ness of 3. The proofs of (3) and (4) involve arguments using Zorn's Lemma, and a similar proof is given below, in Proposition 2.2. a These facts will be used in the sequel without mention.
De ne U ;! L3 V if for all 2 V , L3 2 U. And de ne relations such a s U ;! 3L V and U;! 23 V similarly. F or example, U ;! 3L V holds if whenever 2 V , 3L 2 U.
The following consequence of the Cross Axioms will be used frequently.
Proposition 2.2 Let U and V be m-theories, and suppose that there is some W such that U;! 3 W;! L V . Then there is some T so that U;! L T;! 3 V .
?
-?
Proof Let S = f3 : 2 V g f : K 2 Ug. We claim that S is consistent suppose towards a contradiction that it is not. Then there is a nite subset S 0 of S which i s inconsistent. Write S 0 = f3 1 3 2 3 : : : 3 n g f 1 2 : : : m g where each i belongs to V , and for each j, K j 2 U. Let = 1^ ^ n , and similarly let = 1^ ^ m . V is closed under conjunction, so 2 V . And since K is equivalent t o a conjunction K( 1^ ^ m ) f r o m U, w e see that K 2 U. Finally 3 ! 3 i for all i, a n d ! j for all j. Since S 0 is inconsistent,`3 ! : . Therefore`L3 ! L: hence this sentence belongs to U. And also, 2 V , s o L 2 W and 3L 2 U. S o L3 2 U by t h e Cross Axiom. It follows that L: 2 U. But since K 2 U, t h i s g i v es the contradiction that U is inconsistent. So S is consistent. Let T S be maximal consistent. By construction, U;! L T;! 3 V . a Proposition 2.2 is the embodiment of the Cross Axiom scheme in the realm of m-theories. The next result is a generalization which will be used in the proof of completeness.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that T 1 ;! 3 T 2 ;! 3 T n , and suppose that T n ;! L U. Then there are U 1 ;! 3 U 2 ;! 3 U n so that U n = U, and for all i, T i ;! L U i .
Proof Given all the m-theories above, we l e t U n = U. Since T n;1 ;! 3 T n ;! L U n , w e get U n;1 from Proposition 2.2 so that T n;1 ;! L U n;1 ;! 3 U n . W e continue backwards in this way, obtaining U n;2 , : : : , U 1 . a
Completeness of the Subset Space Logic
The goal of this section is to prove the following result:
Theorem 2.4 The axioms are c omplete for interpretation in subset spaces. That is, if T j = , then T` . Theorem 2.4 implies the compactness theorem for the subset space logic. Its proof will be given in the course of this section.
The rst idea in proving completeness is to consider the canonical model of the logic. This is the set T H of m-theories together with the relations ;! 3 and ;! L de ned in Section 2.1. What we w ould like most is a way to de ne a family O of subsets of T H in order to obtain a subset space. Then, following standard modal completeness proofs, we w ould hope to show that every m-theory T is the theory of some pair p u from that model. (Indeed, we might hope that p would be T itself.) Unfortunately, this idea does not seem to work. The problem is that we do not know a n y way to de ne a subset space structure on T H which leads to completeness. For this reason, we do not approach completeness via the canonical model. Our strategy is to build a space X of \abstract" points. We shall also have opens given in an abstract way, via a poset P a n d a n a n titone (i.e., order-reversing) map i : P ! P (X).
(Here, P (X) is the set of non-empty subsets of X.) The points are abstract since they are not theories. But with each x and each p so that x 2 i(p) w e shall have a \target" m-theory t(x p). The goal of the construction is to arrange that in the overall model, th(x i(p)) = t(x p).
As usual, in order to prove completeness we need only prove t h a t e v ery m-theory T has a model. Fix such a m-theory T. W e build (1) A set X containing a designated element x 0 .
(2) A poset hP i with least element ?. (3) A function i : P ! P (X) such t h a t p q i i(p) i(q), and i(?) = X. (That is, a homomorphism from hP ?i to hP (X) X i.) (4) A partial function t : X P ! T H with the property that t(x p) is de ned i x 2 i(p).
Furthermore, we ensure the following properties for all p 2 P, x 2 i(p), and :
, then for some y 2 i(p), 2 t(y p).
(b.1) If q p, then t(x p);! 3 t(x q).
(b.2) If 3 2 t(x p), then for some q p, 2 t(x q). (c) t(x 0 ?) = T, where T is the m-theory from above which w e aim to model.
Suppose we h a ve X P i , a n d t with these properties. Then we consider the subset space X = hX fi(p) : p 2 Pg i: where (P ) = fx : A 2 t(x ?)g.
Lemma 2.5 (The Truth Lemma) Assume conditions (1) { (4) for X, P, i, a n d t. Then for all x 2 X and all p 2 P such that x 2 i(p),
Proof By induction on . The atomic case holds by the de nition of X, and the induction steps for the boolean connectives are consequences of the fact that the sets in T H are m-theories.
Suppose that x i(p) j = L . Then there is some y 2 i(p) s u c h t h a t y i(p) j = . By induction hypothesis, 2 t(y p). By property (4a.1), t(x p);! L t(y p). Therefore L 2 t(x p).
On the other hand, if L 2 t(x p), then by property (4a.2) there is some y 2 i(p) s u c h that 2 t(y p). By induction hypothesis, y i(p) j = . Therefore x i(p) j = L . This concludes the induction step for L. W e complete the proof with the induction step for 3.
Suppose that x i(p) j = 3 . Then there is some i(q) i(p) s u c h that x 2 i(q), and x i(q) j = . By (3), q p, and the induction hypothesis implies that 2 t(x q). Finally, b y (4b.1), t(x p);! 3 t(x q). Therefore, 3 2 t(x p).
Going the other way, suppose that 3 2 t(x p). Then by (4b.2), there is some q p such that 2 t(x q). By induction hypothesis,
a By the Truth Lemma and property (4c) above, theory X (x 0 ?) = T. So the m-theory that we started with has a model. In the usual way, this proves the Completeness Theorem.
We build X, P, i, a n d t by recursion. That is, we build approximations X n , P n , i n , and t n satisfying certain local and global properties. The idea is that if we h a ve a point x and a set u, with a target t(x p), we should try to insure that t(x p) is the theory of x p in the overall completed model. This means that we will need to add points to the model (to witness the L sentences of t(x p), and we will also have to add elements to the partial order (for the 3 sentences). Of course, when we add points we m ust also specify their targets relative t o all sets to which they belong. So the overall construction generates new requirements as it proceeds.
Fix two o b j e c t s x 0 and ?. The local properties that the construction will satisfy are as follows, where our numbering schemes are intended to be parallel to the one above for conditions (1){(4): (L1) X n is a nite set containing x 0 .
(L2) P n is a nite poset with ? as minimum, and with the property that for each p 2 P n , the lower set of p, fq 2 P n : q pg, is linearly ordered. (L3) i n : P n ! P (X n ), where P (X n ) is the collection of subsets of X n with at least two elements. This map i n has the property that p q i i n (q) i n (p) also i n (?) = X n .
(L4) t n : X n P n ! T H is a partial function with the property that t n (x p) is de ned i x 2 i n (p). Furthermore, we assume the following properties for all x 2 X n and p 2 P n :
We should make a few remarks on these conditions. In (L2), the requirement t h a t t h e lower sets of points be linear orders is essential to our construction. By maintaining this property throughout the construction, we can use Proposition Of course, pr p^q] = pr q^p]. efproposition-linear to add points to the model. The condition in (L3) that each i n (p) h a ve at least two elements is a technical one. It is not really necessary, but it leads to a slight simpli cation of the overall construction (in Case 2, near the end of the proof).
The global properties are that for all n: (G1) X n X n+1 .
(G2) P n+1 is an end extension of P n . That is, P n is a suborder of P n+1 , a n d i f p 2 P n+1 , q 2 P n and p q, t h e n p 2 P n . (G3) For all p 2 P n+1 , i n+1 (p) \ X n = i n (p).
(G4) The restriction of t n+1 to X n P n is t n .
Finally, our construction has some overall requirements: (R4a) If L 2 t n (x p), then for some m > n , there is some y 2 i m (p) such that 2 t m (y p).
(R4b) If 3 2 t n (x p, then for some m > n , there is some q p in P m such t h a t 2 t m (x q).
Suppose we build X n , P n , i n , a n d t n in accordance with the (L), (G), and (R) requirements. Let X = S n X n , and let P be the limit of the posets P n . Let i be de ned by i(p) = S n>m i n+1 (p), where m is the least number such t h a t p 2 P m . Finally, let t(x p) = t n (x p), where n is any n umber such t h a t t n (x p) is de ned. (The construction has arranged that t n (x p) = t n+1 (x p) w h e n e v er the latter is de ned.) Proposition 2.6 Suppose we build X n , P n , i n , and t n in accordance with the (L), (G), and (R) requirements. Then X, P, i, and t as de ned a b ove satisfy conditions (1) { (4) above.
Proof Obviously, (1) and (2) hold. To c heck (3), note rst that x 2 i(p) i for some n, x 2 i n (p). This implies that if p q, t h e n i(p) i(q). On the other hand, if p 6 q, then let n be such that both p, q 2 X n . By (G2), p 6 q in X n , s o b y (L3), let x 2 i n (p) ; i n (q). By (G3), i n (q) = X n \ i(q), so as x 2 i n (p) X n , x = 2 i(q). Hence i(p) 6 i(q). It is also easy to see that i(?) = X. This completes the veri cation of (3). The veri cations of (4) are consequences of the overall (R) requirements and conditions (G4) and (L4c).
a Now w e turn to the details of the construction. At the outset, we x a map : ! ! f L 3g ! ! with the property that if (n) = ( x m k) t h e n m < n , and for all (x m k) there is some n > m such t h a t (n) = ( x m k). Note that here fL 3g is just a set of symbols we could use f1 2g here instead but prefer to use a more suggestive notation.
We de ne by recursion on n a tuple hX n P n i n t n n n i. The last two items here are functions whose purpose is to insure all of the (R) requirements are met in an orderly fashion in countably many steps. The domain of each n and n is !. W e shall require that n is a map from ! onto f(x p ) 2 X n P n L: L 2 t n (x p)g n is a map from ! onto f(x p ) 2 X n P n L: 3 2 t n (x p)g (Of course, the sets on the right w i l l b e c o u n table, so functions n and n will certainly exist.)
We start with X 0 as a two-element set fx 0 x 1 g. (Making X 0 into a two-element s e t shortens our argument a tri e later on.) P 0 is the trivial poset f?g, i 0 (?) = X 0 , a n d t 0 (x 0 ?) = T. Note that this satis es all of the (L) requirements. We also x functions 0 and 0 to satisfy the above equations. (Otherwise, 0 and 0 are arbitrary.)
Now suppose we are at stage n + 1 of the construction. There are two cases, depending on the value of (n + 1 ) .
Case 1 (n + 1 ) = ( L m k) for some m and k. Consider m (k), and let this triple be (x p ). So we h a ve L 2 t m (x p). Let y be a new point n o t i n X n . Let X n+1 = X n f yg.
Let P n = P n+1 . Let i n+1 (q) = ( i n (q) f yg if q p i n (q) otherwise Before going any further, note that conditions (L1), (L2), (G1), (G2) , and (G3) are trivial in this case. Also, i n+1 (?) = X n+1 . W e c heck t h a t q r i i(r) i(q) b y looking at three cases. If neither q p nor r p, then i n+1 (q) = i n (q) a n d i n+1 (r) = i n (r). So we're done by induction hypothesis. If both q and r are below p, then since i n+1 (q) = i n (q) f yg, a n d i n+1 (r) = i n (r) f yg, w e see that i n+1 (r) i n+1 (q) i i n (r) i n (q). Finally, suppose that q p but r 6 p. First, r 6 q, and to be sure i n+1 (q) 6 i n+1 (r). Second, since y = 2 i n+1 (r) a n d i n+1 (q) = i n (q) f yg, w e again have t h a t i n+1 (r) i n+1 (q) i i n (r) i n (q). This completes the veri cation of (L3).
To de ne t n+1 , w e stipulate that (G4) holds. What is left is to de ne t n+1 (y q) f o r q p.
Here we use (L2) to see that fq : q pg is a nite, linearly ordered set. Write this set as q 1 q 2 q N = p. S o t(x q 1 ) ;! 3 t(x q 2 ) ;! 3 ; ! 3 t(x q N ):
Let U be such t h a t t(x q N );! L U and 2 U. By Proposition 2.3, there are m-theories U 1 : : : U N so that U = U N , t(x q i );! L U i for all i, a n d U 1 ;! 3 ; ! 3 U N . L e t t(y q i ) = U i for 1 i N. This de nition of t n+1 insures (L4b).
To c heck that (L4a) holds for n+1, suppose that a b 2 i n+1 (q). We m i g h t a s w ell assume that a = y, and hence that q p. I f b = y also, then we h a ve t n+1 (a q);! L t n+1 (b q) b y t h e re exivity o f ;! L . S o w e assume that b 6 = y i . e . , b 2 i n (q). Now x 2 i n+1 (q), since q p. B y the de nition of t n+1 , and by the assumption that (L4a) holds for n, t n+1 (x q);! L t n+1 (b q). By construction, and by (G4), t n+1 (x q);! L t n+1 (y q). So by symmetry and transitivity, t n+1 (y q);! L t n+1 (b q). This completes the veri cation of (L4a).
Case 2 (n + 1 ) = ( 3 m k ) for some m and k. This time we consider m (k), and let this triple be (x p ). So 3 2 t n (x p).
Let y = 2 X n , and let q = 2 P n . Let X n+1 = X n f yg. L e t P n+1 = P n f qg with the partial order extended so that for all r 2 P n , r < q in P n+1 i r p. Then the new point q is not below a n y element o f P n , a n d i t s l o wer set is a chain, and we h a ve (L1), (L2), (G1), and (G2). Let i n+1 (q) = fx yg, and for r 2 X n , l e t i n+1 (r) = ( i n (r) f yg if r p i n (r) otherwise By (L3) for n, i n (p) c o n tains a point x 0 6 = x. Since y 6 = x 0 , i n+1 (q) is a proper subset of i n+1 (p). For the same reason, if r q in X n+1 , t h e n i n+1 (q) i n+1 (r). But if r 6 q, t h e n r 6 p and hence y = 2 i n+1 (r). So in this case, i n+1 (q) 6 i n+1 (r). This veri es most of (L3), and the remainder of the veri cation is as in Case 1. Note also that (G3) holds.
It remains to de ne t n+1 , and we start out by stipulating that (G4) holds. For all r p in P n , let t n+1 (r y ) = t n+1 (r x ) and t n+1 (r z ) = t n+1 (r x ). In addition, let t n+1 (q y) = t n+1 (q x) = U, where U is any m-theory so that t n (x p);! 3 U and 2 U. The fact that both (L4a) and (L4b) hold for n implies it easily for n + 1 . This concludes the de nition of X n+1 , P n+1 , i n+1 , a n d t n+1 in either Case 1 or Case 2. To complete the construction in both cases, we n e e d o n l y x e n umerations n+1 and n+1 as above.
This completes the construction. At e a c h step, we h a ve all satis ed each of the (L) and (G) requirements. It remains to check the (R) requirements on the overall construction. We check (R4a) (R4b) is similar. Suppose that L 2 t n (x p). Let k be such t h a t n (k) = (x p ). Let N be such t h a t (N) = ( L n k). Then at stage N we insure that there is some y 2 X N such that 2 t n (y p). In this way, the construction has insured that all of the (R) requirements hold.
This completes the proof of Completeness for subset spaces.
Decidability of the Subset Space Logic
Despite the failure of the nite model property, it turns out that the logic of subset spaces is decidable. We show this by showing that a satis able sentence has a nite cross axiom model, de ned as follows:
De nition A cross axiom frame is a tuple hJ ;! L ;! 3 i such t h a t J is a set, ;! L is an equivalence relation on J, ;! 3 is a preorder on J, and the following property holds: If i;! 3 j;! L k, then there some l such t h a t i;! L l;! 3 k. A cross axiom model is a cross axiom frame together with an interpretation of the atomic symbols of L must satisfy the condition that if i;! 3 j, then i 2 (A) i j 2 (A).
Note that when we i n terpret L on a cross axiom model, we h a ve a single node on the left side of the turnstile. That is, we write, e.g., j j = since there are no sets involved.
The subset space logic is sound and complete for interpretations in cross axiom models. Soundness is checked by induction, of course, and we s k etch the details concerning completeness. Every subset frame X = hX Oi gives rise to a cross axiom frame J X , as follows:
J is just the set of pairs coming from the model it will serve as the carrier set of the cross axiom frame J X , and to get the rest of the frame, let (p u);! L (q v) i u = v, and let (p u);! 3 (q v) i p = q and v u. This de nes J X . T o turn a subset model hX i into a cross axiom model hJ X i, w e s e t (A) = f(p u) : p 2 (A) \ ug. In other words, (A) contains the pairs (p u) such t h a t p u j = A. An easy induction shows that p u j = (in the subset semantics) i p u j = (in the cross axiom semantics). So in this sense, the subset space model and the cross axiom model are equivalent. It follows that if T is satis able in a subset space model, then T is satis able in a cross axiom model. Therefore, the subset space logic is complete for interpretations in cross axiom models.
Since our language is bimodal and cross axiom models are just (special kinds of) Kripke structures, we h a ve a natural notion of bisimulation. To be precise, if J and K are cross axiom models, then a bisimulation from J to K is a relation R J K such t h a t (1) If jRk, then for all atomic symbols A, j 2 J (A) i k 2 K (A) (2) If jRkand j;! 3 j 0 , then there is some k 0 so that k;! 3 k 0 and j 0 Rk 0 . C o n versely, i f jRk and k;! 3 k 0 , then there is some j 0 so that j;! 3 j 0 and j 0 Rk 0 .
(3) The same condition, with ;! L replacing ;! 3 .
Then an easy induction on sentences shows that if jRk, then th J (j) = th K (k). In words, bisimilar points satisfy the same sentences.
Example. hb wi;! 3 hb w 0 i We also have the identity ;! 3 arrows, and all the instances of transitivity. For ;! L , w e relate pairs with the same last letter. E.g., we h a ve c u];! L ha ui;! L b u].
It is not hard to check that these relations give a cross axiom frame. We i n terpret the atomic predicates A, B, and C on it in the obvious way: (A) = f a u] a v] ha ui ha wig, (We require that i > j so that the data from X makes sense.) Intuitively, the angular brackets are used when the point is the last element of the set, and the square brackets are used and in the other case. This makes it easy to check that R is a bisimulation.
This bisimulation implies facts about X. F or example, th(a 2 u 2 ) = th(a 3 u 3 ). It is not hard to check that the theories of all the points in Y are di erent one uses the sentences from Example B.
Finally, Y is the smallest cross axiom model which w e k n o w of with the property that there are j and k with j;! 3 k;! 3 j with di erent theories.
Another example of a cross axiom model which is not a subset space is the canonical model of the subset space logic: C(ca) = hT H ;! L ;! 3 i: (The \ca" stands for \cross axiom" we shall have a n umber of other canonical models in later sections.) Proposition 2.2 is just the assertion that this tuple actually is a cross axiom model. The standard truth lemma for this structure shows that for all T 2 T H , th(T) = T that is, the set of sentences satis ed by t h e p o i n t T in C(ca) i s T itself. We shall develop a theory of ltration on this model to prove a nite model property. H o wever before we t u r n to that work, we present another example and some general discussion.
We return now to the development of ltration. Let be any sentence, and consider the following sets:
; 0 = together with all of its subsentences. Note that all of these sets are nite and closed under subsentences, and also that up to equivalence, ; : is closed under negation, ;^under^, and ; under L. It is also convenient to de ne ; L = ; n ;^. (That is, ; L is the set-theoretic di erence of ; and ;^.) Of course, all of these classes of sentences depend on the original , and occasionally we use the notation ;( ), etc., to mark this dependence.
Let be any nite set, and let s be a map from a superset of into fT Fg. De ne s =^f : 2 s ( ) = Tĝf: : 2 s ( ) = Fg: Note that for all 2 , s` or s: (or both).
This notation s works for any nite , but we shall only have occasion to use it when is of one of the forms ; 0 ( ), ; : ( ), etc. Here are three useful general facts. First, for all t, ; t $ (; L t^;t ):
All that we are doing here is separating the conjunction ; t into two smaller conjunctions, by collecting all of the elements of ; L t in the rst conjunct. Second, if ; t is consistent theǹ ;t $ ; 0 t : (8) To see this, note rst that ; 0 t 2 ;^. S o i f ; t is consistent, then ; 0 t is a conjunct of ;t . Also, the consistency implies that no conjunct of ;t can contradict ; 0 t t h us all such conjuncts must follow from ; 0 t . Moreover, the fact that ; 0 t 2 ;^implies that ;t can itself be regarded as an element o f ;. Our nal fact is that ; L t^L ;t ! L(; L t^;t ):
The reason for this is that all of the conjuncts of ; L t are K or L sentences so (9) Proof Suppose that ; s^L ; t is consistent. We claim that s and t agree on ; L . F or if not, let L be a sentence in ; L on which s and t disagree. Suppose that s(L ) = T while t(L ) = F. T h e n ; s`L , a n d ; t`K : . By the S5 l a ws, L; t`K : . This implies that L; t is inconsistent with ; s , and this is a contradiction.
Assume ; s . By the version of (7) for s, w e h a ve ; L s , and since s and t agree on ; L we get ; L t . Moreover, because of (8) and our observation there, ;t can be regarded as a sentence of ;^, hence L;t can be regarded as in ;. Then since ; t is consistent, ; L t`L ;t . T h us we have ; L t^L ;t . By (9) and (7), we g e t L; t .
(In fact, ; s^L ; t is consistent i s and t agree on ; L i `; s ! L; t .) a
As a consequence of this result, we c a l l ; ( ) t h e strong closure o f under L. Let be consistent. Our strategy to get a nite model for will be to carry out a ltration on C(ca), using ;( ). We will use the (standard) minimal ltration for both modalities. More precisely, let S 2 C (ca). Abusing the notation, we will write ; S for ; 1 S , where 1 S is the characteristic function of S on ;. De ne an equivalence relation ; on C(ca) b y S ; T i ; S = ; T :
These are equivalent to the condition that S \; = T \ ;. Let S] denote the ; -equivalence class of S, and let C(ca)] be the set of all equivalence classes of m-theories. Note that C(ca)] is nite indeed its size is at most 2 N , where N is the size of ;. For transitivity o f ;! 3 , w e use the characterization of Proposition 2.9. We m ust show that if ; S^3 ; T and ; T^3 ; U are both consistent, then so is ; S^3 ; U . F or this we will use a semantic argument based on the completeness of the logic of subset spaces.
Let J be a cross axiom model containing some j such t h a t j j = ; S^3 ; T , and let K be a cross axiom model containing some k such t h a t k j = ; T^3 ; U . Consider a new model J ; K de ned as follows: The set of nodes of J ; K is the disjoint union of the nodes of J and K. F or p q 2 J ; K, w e d e n e p;! L q if this relation holds in either J or K. F urther, p;! 3 q holds in J ; K if it holds in either J or K or if there are j 2 J and k 2 K such that p;! 3 j in J, k;! 3 q in K, a n d ; \ th J (j) = ; \ th K (k):
(10) An equivalent w ay to write (10) is ; th(j) = ; th(k) . (These are equivalent since sets of the form th(j) are maximal.) Note that J ; K is not the same as K ; J. The reason is that the condition on the ;! 3 relation on J ; K is not symmetric in J and K.
We c heck that J ; K is a cross axiom frame. It is obvious that ;! L is an equivalence relation on J ; K, and that ;! 3 is re exive. For transitivity o f ;! 3 , t h e r e a r e o n l y t wo nontrivial cases: when j;! 3 p;! 3 k where j 2 J, k 2 K, a n d p is in either J or K. Suppose that p 2 K. Then there are c 2 J and d 2 K such that j;! 3 c, d;! 3 p, a n d ; \ th(c) = ; \ th(d). Then by transitivity within K, w e h a ve d;! 3 k, so the same c and d witness that j;! 3 k in J ; K. The argument when p 2 J is similar.
To c heck t h a t J ; K satis es the cross property, the only nontrivial case is when j ;! 3 k ;! L k 0 where j 2 J and k k 0 2 K. Let c 2 J and e 2 K be such t h a t j;! 3 c, e;! 3 k, a n d ; \ th(c) = ; \ th(e). Applying the cross property i n K we can nd some e 0 such that e;! L e 0 ;! 3 b 0 . By Proposition 2.8, ; e`L ; e 0 . Since e j = ; e , there must be some c We h a ve completed the veri cation that J ; K is a cross axiom frame. We g e t a m o d e l in the obvious way, b y taking the interpretation of an atomic sentence to be the union of its interpretations in J and K.
Claim For all j 2 J and 2 ;, j j = K i j j = J ; K . Proof By induction on 2 ;. The atomic step is immediate, and the induction steps for the boolean connectives are trivial. For L, n o t e t h a t i f L 2 ;, then also 2 ;. If j j = J ; K L , then there is some p 2 J ; K so that p j = J . T h i s p must belong to J by t h e de nition of ;! L in J ; K. So the induction hypothesis applies, and j j = J L . C o n versely, if j j = J L , the induction hypothesis implies that j j = J ; K L .
For 3, assume that 3 2 ;. Then also 2 ;. Suppose that j j = J ; K 3 2 ; we prove that j j = J 3 . There is some p 2 J ; K such t h a t j;! 3 p and p j = J ; K . Suppose that p 2 K (otherwise the argument is trivial). Then there are c 2 J and k 2 K such that j;! 3 c, b;! 3 p, a n d ; \ th(c) = ; \ th(k). Since k j = K 3 and 3 2 ;, c j = J 3 . Then there is some p 0 2 J such that c;! 3 p 0 and p 0 j = J . By induction hypothesis, p 0 j = J ; K . B y t h e transitivity o f ;! 3 in J, j j = J 3 .
The converse assertion for 3 is immediate from the induction hypothesis. a We n o w complete the proof that ; S^3 ; U is consistent. Recall that we h a ve j 2 J and k 2 K so that j j = J ; S and k j = K 3; U . By the claim above, j j = ; S in J ; K.
Furthermore, a similar claim holds for K, except the proof is easier. (All arrows in J ; K which begin at a node of K also end at node of K. So the inclusion of K into J ; K is a bisimulation.) So k j = J ; K 3; U . Moreover, let c 2 J be such t h a t j ;! 3 c and c j = ; T , and let d 2 K be such that k ;! 3 d and d j = J ; K ; U . T h e n c and k witness that j ;! 3 d in J ; K, so that j j = J ; K 3; U . T h us ; S^3 ; U is consistent. ; T` and that 3 satis es the analogous properties. So for all S and all 2 ;, S j = C(ca) i S] j = C(ca)] :
All of these facts are standard consequences (see, e.g., Go]) of the fact that we are dealing with the minimal ltration. From these facts, we can complete the proof of the nite model property. Let be consistent, and let S be a complete theory containing . From the ltration conditions above, it follows that for all m-theoriesS, S] j = S \ ; in the nite cross axiom model C(ca)]. In particular, S ] j = . F urthermore, we could get a bound on the size of S ] a s a computable function of . S o w e h a ve p r o ved the following: Theorem 2.11 Any consistent sentence has a nite cross axiom model. Since the subset space l o gic is complete for interpretations in cross axiom models, it is therefore d e cidable.
On the Logic of Intersection Spaces
In this section, we present a few results about intersection spaces. Concerning the complete theories assuming this axiom, we also have:
(1) For all T, there is some V so that T;! 23 V .
(2) If T;! 23 V and T;! 3 U, then U;! 23 V .
Proof All of these assertions are standard results for a weakly-directed S4 modality. a
Before presenting the remaining axioms for intersection spaces, we present a few consequences of our main examples.
Proposition 2.2 Concerning spaces closed under intersection:
(1) The subset space axioms and the Weak Directedness Axiom are not complete for intersection spaces.
(2) The axiom 23 ! 32 (the converse of the Weak Directedness Axiom) is not sound for intersection spaces. (Later, we show that this axiom holds in all lattices.) (3) There a r e m -t h e oriesT 6 = U realizable in intersection spaces so that T;! 23 U;! 23 T.
Proof We use the notation of Examples B and C, together with the facts about them from Section 1.3. A look at Example C will show w h y the axioms so far are not complete for intersection spaces. Note rst that all the m-theories realized in this model do satisfy the Weak Directedness Axiom. The reason is that up to L-equivalence, T 0 is the unique -minimal theory of X. F rom this fact it is easy to check that the Weak Directedness Axiom is satis ed in the m-theory T.
We showed already that T has no models closed under intersection.
To get an example of (2) a To summarize, the axioms of subset spaces together with Weak Directedness Axiom are not complete.
As we noted above, the Weak Directedness Axiom is unfortunately not strong enough to yield a complete axiomatization of the validities of intersection spaces. We present here an in nite family of new axioms, which w e call the Sliding Axioms. Since they are a rather complicated scheme, we present a simple case rst. We h a ve not been able to prove completeness for these axioms, only soundness together with the fact that no Sliding Axiom follows from the previous axioms.
Sliding Axiom, Preliminary Form For example, suppose that X = hX Oi is a subset space, x 2 X, and u : P ! O is an antitone map (so that x 2 u p for all p). Let p be any s e n tence so that x u p j = p . T h e n for all p, x u p j = P ] p . It will be very instructive for the reader to investigate the converse of this observation. Suppose P is a poset, and is such that x X j = P ] ? . Is it possible to nd an antitone map p 7 ! u p so that for all p, x u p j = p ? The answer is that it is not generally possible. The problem is that we m i g h t h a ve q above b o t h r and s, and also u r j = r and u s j = s . W e k n o w that there is some u q r u r so that u q r j = q . Also, there is some u q s u s so that u q s j = q . But what we need is some u q u r \ u s with this property. To be sure u q exists, we need the original space to satisfy something stronger than P ] ? .
And for this, we need a bit of notation. Let lin(P ) P be the set of elements of P whose lower sets are linearly ordered. Each p 2 lin(P ) has a unique predecessor q t h a t i s q < p is unique so that there is no q < r < p . Similarly, let nonlin(P ) = P n lin(P ). Note that lin(P ) is closed downward, and nonlin(P ) is closed upward in P.
A poset is non-linear if > 2 nonlin(P ). The non-linear case is the interesting one in the results below because when the order is linear, the results below h a ve easier proofs.
Let S be a nite set of sentences, and then let B(S) be the set of complete boolean combinations of sentences from S. I f : P ! L , : P ! B (S) a n d 2 L , then we de ne : P ! L by
Intersection Axiom II (Sliding Axiom) For each nite, bounded, acyclic, non-linear poset P, each nite set S L , and each : P ! L so that > is an L-sentence L , P ] ?^p
Proposition 2.3 The Sliding Axiom is sound for intersection spaces.
Proof Fix an intersection space X = hX Oi, and consider an instance of the Sliding Axiom. Assume x X satis es the antecedent. Then we de ne an antitone map u : P ! O so that x 2 u p for all p, and so that x u p j = P ] p . The de nition is by recursion on P. Let u ? = X. Suppose we are given u q for q < p . There are two cases: either p 2 lin(P ) o r p 2 nonlin(P ). First we de ne u p for all p 2 lin(P ). Then the elements below p are a linear order, and in particular, there is a unique predecessor q of p. Then since x u q j = P ] q , 3 The Logic of Lattice Spaces, Complete Lattice Spaces, and Topological Spaces
We turn to lattice spaces, those which are closed under nite unions and intersections. We are even interested in the smaller classes of topological spaces and complete lattice spaces. As it happens, though, the axioms for nite lattices turn out to be complete for the smaller classes. This is in contrast to the case for intersection spaces, where the complete intersection spaces satisfy the law 23 ! 32 (see the discussion just before Corollary 3.11). The spaces closed under nite intersections do not necessarily satisfy this law, as shown in Proposition 2.2. It is not at all obvious that lattice spaces satisfy this axiom, but it will follow from our results below.
Our main results in this section are the completeness and decidability of topologic (Theorems 3.10 and 3.19). The latter result was rst proved by Georgatos G2] by a di erent argument. Our method gives a connection of topologic to much earlier work on topology and modal logic due to McKinsey. Indeed, we believe that our proof of McKinsey's Theorem 3.6 is new, and that result is the basis of our completeness result for topologic.
Bi-persistent S e n tences and the Prime Normal Form Lemma
The work in this section is essentially a simpli cation of the construction from Konstantinos Georgatos' Ph.D. thesis G1] The overall goal is a normal form theorem which p l a ys a key role in the completeness theorem for topologic.
De nition A s e n tence is bi-persistent if`3 ! 2 . Semantically, this means that satisfaction of i n a w orld x u depends only on the point x. S o w e s a y is bi-persistent for intersection spaces if for all intersection spaces X = hX Oi and all p 2 u 2 O , i f p u j = , then p X j = 2 . W e de ne bi-persistence for lattice s p aces and bi-persistence for topological spaces similarly.
De nition Let be the smallest set of sentences containing the atomic sentences, and closed under boolean operations and the operators 3K and 2L.
Proposition 3.1 (Georgatos G2]) All sentences in are bi-persistent on all subset spaces satisfying the intersection axiom. In particular, all sentences in are bi-persistent for intersection spaces.
Proof By induction on 2 . The atomic sentences are bi-persistent b y the axiom (A ! 2A)^(:A ! 2:A). The negation of a bi-persistent s e n tence is easily seen to be bi-persistent. Suppose and are both bi-persistent. Assuming 3( ^ ) g i v es 3 ^3 whence 2 ^2 . S o 2( ^ ).
Finally, assume that is bi-persistent. To show that 3K is bi-persistent, assume 33K . T h e n 3K , s o 3K3 . Using bi-persistence, we h a ve 3K2 . By the cross axiom, 32K . N o w b y t h e W eak Directedness Axiom, 23K . a Remarks It is easy to check that the Weak Directedness Axiom is needed in order to prove Proposition 3.1. For example, consider a subset space with universe X = fa b cg, o p e n s fa bg and fa cg, and such that the interpretation of the atomic A is fa bg. Then a X j = ( 33KA)^(:23KA) :
So the sentence 3KAneed not be bi-persistent in spaces not closed under intersections.
Second, the converse of Proposition 3.1 is Theorem 3.15 below. That result is a consequence of the completeness theorem for lattice spaces.
De nition Let be the closure under^of the set of sentences of the form L or K , for 2 . Since K distributes over^, a n y sentence in is of the form K ^V i L 0 i . A sentence is in prime normal form (pnf), i f is of the form ^ where 2 and 2 .
Finally, is in normal form (nf), i f is a disjunction of sentences in pnf.
Semantically, satisfaction of a sentence depends only on the neighborhood, not on the point. Thus, is dual to . Our immediate goal is a canonical form for sentences (Lemma 3.3), which asserts that on set lattices, the language L is essentially just the boolean closure of . We rst need the following lemma. We just sketched a semantic proof of (1) so we will give a formal proof only of the rightto-left direction of (2). As a preliminary, note that if is bi-persistent, then`K3 ! K . This is the left side of (2). a Lemma 3.3 (Normal Form Lemma) (Georgatos 2] ) Any sentence i s e quivalent to a sentence in normal form.
Proof By induction on sentences built from atomic sentences using _, :, L, a n d 3. T h e cases of atomic sentences and _ are trivial. For negation, we use De Morgan's Laws and the lattice laws of conjunction and disjunction, together with the fact that is closed under negation.
Assume that is equivalent to a disjunction of pnf's. We s h o w t h a t L has the same
, we m a y assume without loss of generality that itself is in pnf. By induction hypothesis, we h a ve , 0 , a n d 00 i from so that
Finally, assume that is equivalent to a disjunction of pnf's we p r o ve t h i s f o r 3 . A s i n the case of L, w e m a y assume that itself is in pnf. By induction hypothesis, we h a ve , 0 , and 00 i from so that` $ ( ^K 0^V i L 00 i ). By Lemma 3.2, part 2, 3 is equivalent to 3( ^K 0 )^V i L3(K 0^ 00 i ): Now 3( ^K 0 ) is equivalent t o ^3K 0 this belongs to . Bi-persistence also implies that each L3(K 0^ 00 i ) is equivalent t o L(3K 0^ 00 i ). In this way, 3 is equivalent to a conjunction of a sent e n c e i n w i t h a s e n tence in . a Lemma 3.3 provides a sort of \orthogonal decomposition" of the language into and components. We discuss this in the next section.
3.2 McKinsey's Theorem J. C. C. McKinsey McK] initiated a study of the relation of S4 to topology 1 He used the symbols C and I (for closure and interior) instead of 3 and 2. T o a void confusion we will follow him and use C and I for, respectively, the existential and universal modalities of S4. He noted that the interior operator on a topological space has S4-like properties. He also proved a completeness result and a nite model property for his topological interpretation of S4. We review this work below, and we also present proofs of McKinsey's theorems. As it happens, our completeness and nite model results for topologic can be proved from McKinsey's theorems.
McKinsey notes that the logic of S4 corresponds to laws concerning the boolean operations and the operation of interior on a topological space. That is, suppose that hX Oi is a topological space, and consider a map i of atomic sentences A i of L (S4) We w ant to relate this semantics of S4 to the standard Kripke semantics on the one hand, and to the semantics of topologic on the other.
Let (X ) be a Kripke frame satisfying S4. ( We h a ve written the accessibility relation with the symbol for a preorder, since it necessarily is re exive and transitive.) Consider the Alexandrov topology on this frame, where the opens are the sets closed upwards in the order. In this way, w e associate a topological interpretation to each Kripke frame interpretation of S4. (Actually, this gives a special kind of space: the opens are closed under arbitrary intersections. All of our results concerning topological spaces hold for the smaller class of subset spaces closed under all unions and intersections.) Proposition 3.4 For all S4 frames (X ), a l l x 2 X, and all 2 L (S4), x j = S4 i x j = Mc K :
In other words, the two semantics for S4 agree.
Proof By induction on 2 L (S4). The case of the atomic sentences is trivial, as are the induction steps for the boolean connectives.
Assume the lemma for , and consider C . I f x j = S4 C , then there is some y x so that y j = S4 . By induction hypothesis, y j = Note that we h a ve formulated L(S4) using a modal operator I. W e could have also used 2 the point only is that the universal modality corresponds to 3K and not to 2L, since for 2 ,`3K ! , but 6 2L ! . (That is, the interior of a set is a subset of the set not so the closure.) When McKinsey speaks of interpreting a sentence of L(S4) in a topological space, then in our terms he is using and the semantics of topologic.
Proposition 3.5 For all in L(S4), and all topological spaces X = hX Oi,
Assume the lemma for , and consider I . I f x j = Mc K I , t h e n x belongs to the interior of fy 2 X : y j = Mc K g. T h us there is an open u so that for all y 2 u, y j = Mc K . By induction hypothesis, we see that for all y 2 u, ( y X) j = top hence for all y 2 u, b y bi-persistence (y u) j = top . Therefore, x X j = top 3K .
The converse is proved the same way.
a We m i g h t, somewhat tendentiously, s a y that the fact that all of the sentences are bipersistent means that the McKinsey semantics is not using the topology in a very interesting way. This map ; is a bijection of L(S4) onto , and we write its inverse as ; : ! L (S4). Of course, the image of ; is only , not the full language L of topologic. We do not have a nice map of L into L(S4), but to some extent the Normal Form Lemma 3.3 will help us to get around this di culty. W e extend ; and ; to maps on sets by, e . g . , S = f : 2 Sg.
Recall that the canonical Kripke frame for S4 is the set of maximal consistent theories of S4 with the binary relation ;! I . This relation is a preorder I on T H (S4). We obtain a Kripke structure by associating to the atomic sentence A the set fx : A 2 xg. W e regard the Kripke structure for L(S4) as a topological space, using the Alexandrov topology of upper closed sets. Let C(S4) denote this structure. So C(S4) denotes either a Kripke frame or a topological space, and the context should clarify this. Either way, C(S4) is the canonical interpretation of L(S4). Theorem 3.6 (McKinsey) The interpretation of S4 in topological spaces is complete. That is, for every maximal consistent subset T of S4, there is a topological space X = hX Oi and some x 2 X so that x X j = Mc K T. Moreover, if is a satis able sentence o f L(S4), then is satis able in a nite topological space.
Proof Let C(S4) be the canonical Kripke structure/topological space for S4. By the Truth Lemma for S4, the theory of T in C(S4) is T itself. But by Proposition 3.4, this is the same as the theory of the point T, w h e n w e take the topological interpretation. This implies the completeness result.
For the nite model property, w e use the nite model property for the Kripke structure interpretation of S4, together with Proposition 3.4 once again. Proof First we show that if S`S 4 , then S `i nt . (That is, the deduction can be carried out using the basic logic of subset spaces together with the Axiom of Intersection.) To do this, we rst show b y induction on proofs in S4 t h a t i f S4 , then`i nt . T h i s i s by induction on S4 proofs. If is an instance of a propositional tautology, then so is , s ò set spaces . The rst interesting case concerns the normality condition, say in the form S4 ((I )^(I )) ! I( ^ ) :
In this case, note that according to the Axiom of Intersection,
This implication uses the fact that sentences in the image of the map are bi-persistent, and also the Weak Directedness Axiom. Next, we consider the axioms I ! and I ! II . It follows from this that if x is consistent in topologic, so is x T H (S4). Then this same result holds for the property of maximal consistency.
We regard ; as a map ; : C(top) ! C (S4). To show t h a t ; is surjective, let S be a maximal consistent subset of L(S4). S is a point in the the topological space C(S4), and the theory of S in the McKinsey semantics is S itself. So the theory of S in the topologic semantics is S . Thus S is maximal consistent in topologic. So (S ) = S is maximal consistent i n S4.
We n o w know that ; and ; are bijections between the points of C(S4) and C(top). It is easy to check t h a t x 2L y in C(top) i x I y in C(S4). Thus the two maps are also bijections between the collections of opens. Thus they are isomorphisms of subset spaces. a Proof Let th(x u) be the (topologic) theory of (x u) i n C(top). By Proposition 3.8,
x th(x u). We next check that that S(u) th(x u) a s w ell. To see this, suppose that L 2 S(u) because some y 2 u contains . Then since y th(y u), L 2 th(x u). Finally, suppose that K 2 S(u). Then again, for all y 2 u, 2 y th(y u). Thus K 2 th(x u).
Since th(x u) is closed under deduction, (x u) th(x u). Thus (x u) is consistent. The Complete Intersection Axiom is sound for complete intersection spaces. To see this, consider a point x in some space. Let u x be the intersection of all opens containing x. Then x u x j = ( 2 _ 2: ). On the other hand, Proposition 2.2 shows that it is not sound for intersection spaces. Intuitively, this is because closure under nite intersections is not enough to guarantee that the neighborhoods of a point e v entually stabilize on or on : .
The interesting point is that this axiom is sound for lattice spaces. Proof We p r o ve that each instance of the axiom is valid. Let hX Oi be a lattice space, and let x 2 u 2 O . Let T = th X (x u). Let y v 2 C (top) b e s u c h that th C(top) (y v) = T.
Then since the canonical model is closed under all intersections, each Complete Intersection Axiom belongs to th C(top) (y v) = T. a We can also look at this result purely semantically. For each space hX Oi and each x, w e h a ve x X j = 3(2 _ 2: ). Thus there is some open u containing x so that either x u j = or x u j = : . W e call this fact the minimal neighborhood p r operty. W e do not know a completely elementary proof that it holds on lattice spaces, and we also do not know an elementary syntactic proof of Corollary 3.11.
3.4 Further Results on Bi-persistent S e n tences Theorem 3.12 shows that the embedding ; of S4 i n to is faithful in terms of proofs. That is, all theorems of topologic of the form S` , where S f g , even those whose proofs use the cross axiom or the union axiom, could be obtained simply as translations of S4 proofs.
In a di erent direction, we also show that the class contains all sentences which are bi-persistent on all nite lattice spaces.
Theorem 3.12 For all S and in L(S4), S`S 4 i S `t op i S `i nt :
Proof We s h o wed in the proof of Theorem 3.7 that if S`S 4 , then S `i nt . It is trivial that if S `i nt , then S `t op . Conversely, suppose that S 6 S4 . T h e n S f : g is consistent. The map ; preserves consistency, s o S f : g is consistent in topologic thus S 6 top . a Corollary 3.13 If S , 2 , a n d S`t op , then S`i nt .
Proof If S`t op , t h e n b y Theorem 3.12, S `S 4 . T h e n S`i nt . a
This result can also be proved semantically:
Proposition 3.14 Let T . I f T is satis able in an intersection space, then T is satisable in a complete lattice s p ace.
Proof Suppose X = hX O 1 i is an intersection space such t h a t x X j = T. Proof Suppose that is bi-persistent. Then by the Normal Form Lemma,`t op $ W i i , where each i is in pnf and we m a y assume without loss of generality that each i is consistent. Furthermore for each i write i = i^ i , where i 2 a n d i 2 , and i = K i^V j L i j , where the i s a n d i j s are in .
If X and X 0 are disjoint subset spaces then we write X X 0 for the natural union of the two i.e., the points of X X 0 are X X 0 and the opens are fU V j U is open in X, V is open in X 0 g : (We assume here that the is an open in each space, so the opens of X and X 0 are open in X X 0 .) The important thing to note is that if is bi-persistent a n d both X and X 0 satisfy K , then so does X X 0 and if either X or X 0 satis es L , t h e n s o d o e s X X 0 .
For each i let 0 i = i^3 K i 2 let 0 = W i 0 i . Then` ! 0 . We are done if we can show that` 0 ! . So assume towards a contradiction that 0: is consistent. By completeness, there is a model X containing a point x such t h a t x X j = 0: . Let i be such t h a t x X j = 0 i . Choose a neighborhood U of x such t h a t U j = K i . Since i is consistent, there is also a model X 0 of K i^V j L i j . Then in X X 0 we h a ve x U X 0 j = i^K i^ĵ L i j hence x U X 0 j = . But we also assumed that is bi-persistent, and so x X X 0 j = and also x X j = . T h i s i s a c o n tradiction. a Proposition 3.16 There is a sentence which is bi-persistent for intersection spaces, but which is not equivalent to any 2 on all intersection spaces.
Proof Let X be the model from Example B. Now f o r m a n e w s p a c e Z = hZ O 00 i by taking Z to be the disjoint union of X and Y and identifying x and y. Call this point z. W e similarly take O 00 to be the collections of unions of sets in O with sets in O 0 , i d e n tifying x with y. The point is that it is possible to interpret the atomic sentences in Z because both (x X) a n d ( y Y) satisfy , and gives complete information about the atomic sentences which appear in . (The other atomic sentences may b e i n terpreted arbitrarily.)
Recall that we assume to be bi-persistent for subset spaces. Note that z Z j = ( 3 ^3: ) and this contradicts the bi-persistence assumption. a 3.5 The Finite Model Property Lemma 3.18 Let and 0 belong to , and suppose that ^K 0 is consistent in topologic. Then there is a nite topological space X = hX Oi, a p oint x 2 X and an open u 2 O so that x u j = X ^K 0 . Proof If ^K 0 is consistent, then it is satis able. Then the sentence = ^3K 0 is also satis able. Now 2 , so is a satis able sentence of L(S4). By McKinsey's Theorem 3.6, let X be a nite topological space containing a point x so that x j = Mc K . By Proposition 3.5, x X j = top . Thus there is some u 2 O so that x u j = top K 0 . By bi-persistence, x u j = top as well. a Theorem 3.19 (Georgatos G2] ) Suppose that is a consistent sentence of topologic.
Then is satis able in a nite topological space.
Proof We m a y assume that is in prime normal form ^K 0^L 1^ L n : For 1 i n, the sentence i^K 0 is consistent. By Lemma 3.18, let X i be a nite space containing a point x i and an open u i so that x i u i j = X i i^K 0 . Also, let Y be a nite space containing y v so that y vj = Y ^K 0 .
Let X be the disjoint union of X 1 : : : X n and Y. X is a nite topological space. Let u = u 1 u n v. Using the bi-persistence of all of the sentences involved, we see that y uj = X . a 4 References
